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When rapid development threatens Ethiopians’ environmental health, 
the people must decide whether the immediate economic benefits are worth 
the environmental damage.  Many controversies flow from this one idea. 
Some optimists say that economic development “need not” harm the 
environment at all, or that environmental damage in fact will result from 
lack of development.  Others ask what group of people should have the 
power to choose environment or development.  The national legislature?  
The people most affected by the environmental damage?  Or must we 
consider the perspectives of animals and plants as well, or the perspective 
of the earth itself, perhaps personified as “Gaia?”  Still others want to know 
how environmental damage can be quantified so that a cost-benefit analysis 
is can be conducted.  
All of these issues and more are crammed into the now-popular phrase 
“sustainable development.”  First introduced in the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (“WCED”) report in 1987, sustainable 
development was defined as “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.”
1
  The familiar definition appears also in the 1997 
Environmental Policy of Ethiopia (“EPE”).
2
  The definition has been 
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criticized as being vague,
3
 and this is not surprising: all of the issues 
identified above cannot be resolved in an abstract definition.  People must 
flesh out what sustainable development means to them through many tough 
decisions at the edges, at the point that development really means 
environmental damage.  Perhaps most important is the clarity of the 
process by which the tough decisions are made.  
This article argues that environmental permitting is one of those very 
important areas in environmental governance where the process of deciding 
between environment and development can be made clear.  An 
environmental permit is a decision measuring an economic project against 
an explicit set of environmental criteria.  The criteria are set in advance and 
form a definite lower limit of what is sustainable.  If people do not like the 
decision on the permit, they can contest it at the relevant government 
agency, or in court, or politically through elections.  At minimum, the 
people know what decision has been made.  
The main thesis of this article is that international environmental 
ideals like “sustainable development” actually take the place of hard 
decisions and hide the government’s position on the right balance between 
environment and development.  First is the question of whether 
“sustainable development” is used merely to please the international 
community.  In Ethiopian environmental laws, the Amharic for 
“sustainable development” is actually “unstoppable growth,” or, in other 
words, sustained development.
4
  Thus, there is one meaning for English 
readers and another for Amharic readers, and in matters of interpretation it 
is the Amharic that is binding.
5
  The more important question is whether 
the people understand and decide upon minimum environmental standards 
that are more specific than the EPE’s guarantee of sustainable development 
or the Constitution’s rights to sustainable development
6




The grand rhetoric of international ideals is not sufficient to protect 
Ethiopia’s environment.  The government must build on a national 




 3. See e.g., David Hodas, The Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: 
NEPA Reconsidered, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 3 (1998). 
 4. Different Amharic words are used in different legal documents for the English 
“sustainable development.” 
 5. CONSTITUTION, Art. 106 (1995) (Ethiopia). 
 6. Id. Art. 43(1). 
 7. Id. Art. 44. 
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conversation is only possible when the real choices between environment 
and development are made clear.  An easy path to clarity is to give the 
Environmental Protection Authority (“EPA”) a straightforward permitting 
power, such that potentially polluting businesses cannot open or continue to 
operate without a permit directly from the EPA.  The people may choose to 
have weaker environmental standards, or to give EPA some discretion to 
allow more pollution in cases where the economic benefits are particularly 
great, but at least the process would be clear.  EPA would be directly 
accountable, rather than the current situation in which accountability is 
spread among the ministries, licensing agencies, EPA, and regional 
environmental agencies, allowing everyone to always point the finger 
somewhere else.  Moreover, with clear permitting decisions that are 
publicly accessible, citizens would be more able to contribute to 
enforcement efforts through citizen suits. 
 
II. Ethiopia’s Environmental Policy and Sustainable Development 
 
Like most countries, Ethiopia adopted its current environmental laws 
under the influence of increased global environmental awareness that came 
in the wake of the Stockholm Conference in 1972, the WCED report in 
1987, and the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (“UNCED”) in 1992.
8
  The WCED and UNCED specifically 
called on donors to help developing countries establish the national legal 
infrastructure for environmental protection.
9
  Also, with the fall of many 
communist regimes in the early 1990s, new environmental laws became 
part of the international agenda for rebuilding communist countries and 
converting them to more capitalist economies.
10
 
Even before the fall of Ethiopia’s communist government, the process 
 
 8. For a historical overview of international cooperation to solve environmental 
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Governance a Decade After Rio, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 299 (2002); 
Paolo Galizzi, From Stockholm to New York, Via Rio and Johannesburg: Has the 
Environment Lost Its Way on the Global Agenda? 29 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 952 (2006). 
 9. WCED, supra note 1, at 319; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/6/Rev. 1 para 39.1(d) (1992). For more details about 
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Strengthening Environmental Law in the Developing World, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 17, 22-
25, 30 (2000). 
 10. The legal reform process in former communist countries in Eastern Europe is well 
documented. See UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY IN TRANSITION: TEN YEARS OF UNECE ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS (2003). 
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of developing a National Conservation Strategy was begun with 
international help from the World Conservation Union (“IUCN”).
11
  This 
process continued under the new government (of the Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front, or EPRDF) as the Conservation Strategy 
of Ethiopia, culminating in a five-volume report and providing the initiative 
for major environmental actions like the establishment of the 
Environmental Protection Authority in 1995 (and reformation in 2002), the 
incorporation of environmental rights into the 1995 Constitution, and the 
passing of the sweeping cross-sector Environmental Policy of Ethiopia by 
the Council of Ministers in 1997.
12
  Other environmental laws followed, 
including the Water Resources Management Proclamation in 2000 and the 
Environmental Pollution Control Proclamation and Environmental Impact 
Assessment Proclamation in 2002.  
Although much of the initiative for Ethiopian environmental law came 
from international meetings and conversations and responded to scientific 
assessments of environmental health, the domestic policy situation is more 
complex.  Ethiopia is not a passive receiver of international dictates, nor is 
it a micro-model of scientific debate about the environment that mirrors the 
international scientific debate.  This can be seen in domestic laws and 
policies that apply sustainable development ideals.  As Heinz Klug has 
remarked of transnational lawmaking, domestic policymakers often deploy 
international ideals to circumscribe the domestic policy debate, resulting in 




There is no question that Ethiopian environmental policy has been 
heavily influenced by international norms, particularly by the principle of 
sustainable development.  The newly formed EPRDF government in 1992 
sent representatives to the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro and came away 
energized to promote sustainable development.
14
  The IUCN has been 
encouraging sustainable development in Ethiopia and has provided funding 
 
 11. This started in 1989. See James Keeley & Ian Scoones, Knowledge, Power and 
Politics: The Environmental Policy-Making Process in Ethiopia, 38 J. OF MODERN AFRICAN 
STUDIES 89, 103 (2000). 
 12. See JONATHAN MCKEE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ETHIOPIA: COUNTRY 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE 50 (2007). 
 13. Heinz Klug, Hybrid(ity) Rules: Creating Local Law in a Globalized World in 
GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS:  THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (discussing how 
international ideals were brought to bear on domestic property rights in South Africa’s 
constitution-making process). 
 14. Keeley & Scoones, supra note 11, at 104. 
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and technical assistance for Ethiopia’s National Conservation Strategy.
15
  
The Environmental Policy of Ethiopia has as its overall goal “to promote 
sustainable social and economic development.”
16
  The words “sustainable 
development” appear in many different environmental laws, including the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation and the Environmental 
Protection Organs Establishment Proclamation, as well as the Constitution, 
which guarantees the right to sustainable development in Article 43(1).  
It is not fair to say, however, that the idea of sustainable development 
is imposed in a top-down manner by international bodies.  In the first place, 
sustainable development came into popularity at the international level as a 
compromise between developed countries and developing countries, with 
developed countries generally favoring sustainability principles and 
developing countries generally favoring economic development.  
Developing country representatives to international conferences pointed out 
that their nation’s poor are polluted by poverty, not industrial contaminants, 
and even accused rich Western countries of pushing an environmental 
agenda in order to slow their development.
17
  The tension between rich and 
poor countries over environmental protection was evident at Rio and 
subsequent conferences like the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in 2002, and appeared again most recently at the 2009 
Copenhagen Climate Conference.
18
  To the extent that representatives from 
developing countries (typically members of the political elite) truly 
represent developing country citizens, the idea of sustainable development 
must also reflect these citizens’ concerns.  
Sustainable development in any case is difficult for the international 
community to impose because it has an indefinite meaning.  Many of the 
parties to the international compromise on sustainable development have an 
interest in keeping the meaning unclear so as to avoid binding 
environmental commitments.  After Rio, international meetings on 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. EPE, supra note 2, art. 2.1. 
 17. Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro, Environment and Development: The Case of the 
Developing Countries, 26 INT’L ORD. 401 (1972). 
 18. See Galizzi, supra note 8, at 989. Notably, at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate 
Conference, a new subgroup of countries emerged, composed of Brazil, South Africa, India, 
and China.  It appears that this subgroup, led perhaps by China, manipulated poorer 
countries into a blocking move that prevented the normal exchange between rich and poor 
countries—development assistance for environmental guarantees—from happening.  See 
Joseph Curtin, The Copenhagen Conference: How Should the EU Respond?, INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 9 (2010).  Although countries like China certainly 
have divergent interests from the rest of the developing country bloc, attempts to approach 
developing countries separately have been met by accusations from the Chinese of a 
“conspiracy to divide the developing world.”  
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sustainable development have reiterated the importance of development but 
have diluted the sustainability aspect.
19
  Academics also have despaired of 
coming up with an agreed-upon definition for sustainable development.
20
 
Inevitably, the economic component of sustainable development is better 
defined than the environmental component.  WCED stated that economic 
growth at a rate of 3 percent to 6 percent per year would be sustainable, but 
more vaguely that “sustainable development must not endanger the natural 
systems that support life on Earth.”
21
  Measurements of earth endangerment 
are various, contested, and generally clouded by the sweeping scope of the 
problem.  
In Ethiopia, the Amharic words used in various laws to mean 
“sustainable development” are translated literally as unstoppable or 
continuous and ongoing growth.  In other words, Ethiopians think of 
sustainable development as sustained development.  The language of the 
Constitution makes clear that sustainable development in Ethiopia is about 
economic development.  The Constitution has separate provisions for the 
“right to a clean and healthy environment”
22
 and the “right to improved 
living standards and to sustainable development,”
23
 implying that 
sustainable development is about development and not about 
environmental health.  It has been said of Ethiopia’s primary policy 
document on sustainable development, the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP, 2005-2010), that 
“[e]conomic development is the priority whilst . . . issues of environmental 
sustainability are relegated into the background.”
24
  
Although on a local level Ethiopians may prove to be excellent 
environmental stewards, there is little evidence of a pro-environmental 
preservationist movement.  In part, this may be because rural Ethiopians do 
not value the “wild” environment apart from the managed environment of 
their farms and rural communities.
25
  Pro-environmental sentiment comes 
 
 19. The definition of sustainable development coming out of the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg lacked any serious ecological 
commitment, and was thus a step away from the Rio definition.  See Galizzi, supra note 8, 
at 991-993.  
 20. To put it succinctly: “Sustainable development means different things to different 
people.” JON M. CONRAD, RESOURCE ECONOMICS 166 (1999).  
 21. WCED, supra note 1, at 45. 
 22. CONSTITUTION, Art. 44(1) (1995). 
 23. Id. Art. 43(1). 
 24. MCKEE, supra note 12, at 7. 
 25. See Yohannes GebreMichael & Ann Waters-Bayer, Trees are Our Backbone: 
Integrating Environment and Local Development in Tigray Region of Ethiopia, IIED ISSUE 
PAPER NO. 145 at 2, 19 (2007). 
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from the concern for daily survival and not from the desire to preserve 
animals and wild places for their own sake.  The problem of global 
warming is widely known and often invoked as an explanation for 
anomalous weather patterns, but many Ethiopians feel, perhaps rightly, that 
global warming is caused largely by actions in developed countries and that 
Ethiopians can do little about it.
26
  
The preservationist perspective does appear in official policy 
documents, but the government is more likely to follow the local 
nonpreservationist perspective when applying policy.  The Environmental 
Policy contains commitments to preserve biodiversity,
27
 support for a 
“conservation culture,”
28
 and even a right of species to continue existing.
29
  
Moreover, Ethiopia has a national park system—the ideal for 
preservationists—that was established primarily under the emperor in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s in a top-down manner.  However, the Ethiopian 
government has shown itself willing to compromise on conservation in 
parks in favor of economic interests.  For example, the Ethiopian 
Investment Commission, after accidentally allocating land for a German 
biofuel project inside the Babille Elephant Sanctuary, remedied the 
situation by changing the sanctuary boundaries.
30
  Also, when it comes to 
environmental impact assessment, it is often foreign investors or foreign 




When considering how Ethiopia uses “sustainable development,” then, 
it is necessary to distinguish between international and domestic audiences. 
Ethiopia uses the language of sustainable development to communicate to 
the international community its commitment to world ecological stability 
and, thus, to secure foreign aid.  For the domestic audience, sustainable 
development represents the promise of a brighter future and a higher 
standard of living for Ethiopian citizens, and is almost synonymous with 
 
 26. Ethiopian farmers and pastoralists do their best to adapt to changing weather 
patterns, although they are ill-positioned to do so.  See OXFAM, THE RAIN DOESN’T COME ON 
TIME ANYMORE: POVERTY, VULNERABILITY, AND CLIMATE VARIABILITY IN ETHIOPIA (April, 
2010).  Aside from certain changes in local forest management, Ethiopians cannot be 
expected to address the roots of global warming, and they see the problem as economic 
rather than environmental. 
 27. EPE, supra note 2, art. 2.2(a). 
 28. Id. art. 2.3(n). 
 29. Id. art. 2.3(q). 
 30. Yirmed Demeke & Negusu Aklilu, Alarm Bell for Biofuel Development in Ethiopia: 
The Case of Babille Elephant Sanctuary, in AGROFUEL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA (Tibebwa 
Heckett & Negusu Aklilu eds., 2008) 
 31. Interview with Environmental Protection Authority officials (June 2009). 
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steady economic growth.  By using the term “sustainable development,” 
the government adds to its power and legitimacy, holding out the image of 
richer prospects and invoking the power of industrialized nations where the 
term originates.  Ethiopian optimism about development is not, however, 
very useful in its legal applications.  The very flexibility in the meaning of 
“sustainable development,” which is necessary in order to put the word to 
its various uses, makes any legal right or policy goal associated with it 
rather chimeric.  
Environmental policy in Ethiopia has many additional layers of 
complexity. Keeley and Scoones, for example, identify three environmental 
policy discourses in Ethiopia: a Green Revolution discourse, an 
Environmental Rehabilitation discourse, and an emergent Participatory 
Natural Resource Management discourse.
32
  Both the Green Revolution 
discourse and the Environmental Rehabilitation discourse originate in 
science.  The Green Revolution is the movement of technological advances 
in crop productivity from industrialized countries to developing countries. 
Environmental Rehabilitation responds to the scientific assessment of 
resource degradation, particularly relating to soil fertility.  Within Ethiopia, 
these are modern perspectives which lead to uncomfortable juxtapositions 
of science with traditional ways of doing things, often with urban elites 
championing science and blaming “backwards” traditional practices for 
environmental problems.  In theory, Participatory Natural Resource 
Management is the opposite of top-down policies that originate in 
international discourse and elite circles in Addis Ababa and filter down.  
Unfortunately, however, “participation” often relates more to attempts by 
national officials to build up legitimacy for programs than attempts to 
transfer real political power to local people.  
The participatory management discourse highlights one of the 
overarching problems addressed by this article: How can governments 
consciously build support for environmental policies from the ground up?  
Often it appears that the international community is pushing for 
sustainability against the will of a great many poor people who just want 
development. Interestingly, Agenda 21 of the UNCED’s Rio Declaration 
called for “local Agenda 21s” that would build local community support for 
 
 32. Keeley & Scoones, supra note 11, at 90. Keeley and Scoones take a less explicit 
interest in “sustainable development” and do not address at all the way that international 
buzzwords like “sustainable development” are manipulated in local contexts.  Apparently, 
some soil scientists took issue with Keeley and Scoones for treating hard data as an element 
of subjective discourse and for introducing unhelpful contradictions between environmental 
rehabilitation and local resource management.  Jan Nyssen et al., Environmental Policy in 
Ethiopia: A Rejoinder to Keeley and Scoones, 42 J. OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 137 
(2004). 
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sustainable development.
33
  With some naiveté, the international 
community expected local governments everywhere to organize 
conversations with local citizens about sustainable development.  Sparking 
local conversations, not surprisingly, has been difficult.
34
  Ethiopian law 
follows the idea of “local Agenda 21s” in that it requires all regional states 
to have “regional conservation strategies,”
35
 but these have not led to 
widespread discussions about the sustainability of development projects.  It 
has been reported that government officials look down on rural opinions 
and practices with regard to the environment, indicating that the direction 
of discourse is often top-down.
36
  
The starting point for local debate may be empowerment of local 
government, but this leads directly to another question, which is how to 
structure local government so that it can rally local support and produce 
positive environmental outcomes.  Local management is difficult in the 
context of development decisions because the scale and power of local 
government often does not match the scale and power of regulated private 
parties.  Lower level government officials do not have the political standing 
to challenge wealthy businessmen who may have better political 
connections at higher levels in the government.
37
  In addition, local 
governments may compete for development projects, resulting in a race to 
deregulate in order to attract businesses.  Sadly, decentralized management 
may be attractive to national governments simply because it puts the 
responsibility for unwanted decisions onto unqualified actors, allowing the 
national government to avoid difficult decisions.  The Ethiopian 
government has decentralized many environmental permitting decisions to 
regional governments (including the two federal cities, Addis Ababa and 
 
 33. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, Ch. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I). 
 34. Local Agenda 21s arguably have been more successful in some developed 
countries, where a discourse about sustainable development fits culturally.  For one example 
in Australia, see Ben Boer, Institutionalizing Ecologically Sustainable Development:  The 
Roles of National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy Into Action, 
31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 307, 329 (1995).  The U.S. and Canada also have had some limited 
success encouraging local discourse on sustainability. See Virginia MacLaren et al., 
Engaging Local Communities in Environmental Protection with Competitiveness: 
Community Advisory Panels in Canada and the United States, in SUSTAINABILITY, CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 31 (John J. Kirton & Peter I. Hajnal eds., 2006).  
 35. Environmental Protection Organs Establishment Proc. No. 295/2002, FEDERAL 
NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 15 [hereinafter EPO Proc.]. 
 36. See GebreMichael & Waters-Bayer, supra note 25. 
 37. For example, one author has noted that Tigray’s Environmental Protection, Land 
Administration and Use Authority “has little political leverage to enforce environmental 
regulations, e.g. to oblige large-scale enterprises . . . to operate in an environmentally-
friendly way.” GebreMichael & Waters-Bayer, supra note 25, at 8. 
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Dire Dawa) that simply lack the resources and expertise to evaluate 
environmental dangers.  Local districts known as woredas are expected to 
handle certain development decisions directly—and have their own budget 
to do so—but devote very little of their small budgets to environmental 
projects, and do not coordinate at all with regional governments on 
preventive measures like pollution control.
38
  
In the APAP case, discussed below, the EPA argued at one point that 
it should not be responsible for the pollution of rivers because it was 
merely a coordinating organ for regional environmental agencies, and that 
the real responsibility for environmental protection fell on the shoulders of 
the regional agencies.  This argument shows the dangers of the 
decentralization of responsibility, which can become simply the diffusion 
of responsibility. 
 
III. Environmental Permitting in Ethiopia 
 
The problems with Ethiopia’s permitting process get to the heart of the 
difficulties and contradictions in Ethiopia’s overarching policy of 
sustainable development.  Environmental permitting is where 
environmental policy meets practice; it cannot be effective without a real 
commitment by government officials and without real leverage to make 
hard choices between environment and development.  In Ethiopia, delays in 
implementing environmental permitting systems are apparent in several 
government offices and are not explained by simple lack of resources.  In 
the few cases where environmental permitting has been implemented, the 
responsible offices lack the political will or bargaining power to make clear 
choices in favor of the environment and deny permits on the grounds of 
environmental harm.  Instead, what prevails is a state of confusion in which 
it is not clear which office has control over the environmental decisions on 
the permit and, therefore, which office should take responsibility for 
implementing the environmental policy. 
Permitting is the most basic form of government control over modern 
industry.
39
  The phrase “environmental permitting” is meant here in the 
broadest sense possible, including any type of license or permit that has at 
 
 38. MCKEE, supra note 12, at 56-58. 
 39. Most environmental laws incorporate some aspect of permitting.  In the U.S., the 
Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act rely heavily on permitting, and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (and corresponding State Environmental Policy Acts), which can 
be invoked when a project proponent seeks any government permit, renders many 
permitting decisions subject to environmental impact assessment.  In addition, permitting is 
the basis for all cap and trade programs.  
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least one environmental criterion.  In Ethiopia, environmental permits are 
required for any discharge into water bodies,
40
 for collection and disposal 
of solid or hazardous waste,
41
 for operating businesses that cause air or 
water pollution,
42
 and for starting a project or business that has 
environmental impacts and requires an impact statement.  Permitting serves 
the function of registration as well as control, and provides the government 
with a record of potential threats to the environment and a starting point for 
inspections.  The permitting process places the initial cost of gathering 
information and the burden of proof on the regulated party rather than the 
government, and therefore can be relatively inexpensive for the 
government to operate.  Permits are also a great aid to government 
transparency, because they force public communications to and from the 
regulated party.  
Surprisingly, the government environmental agencies in Ethiopia—the 
EPA and regional environmental agencies (“REAs”)—do very little of the 
environmental permitting.  In fact, the EPA and REAs have legal authority 
only to issue permits for hazardous waste,
43
 and, in practice, do not issue 
any permits or licenses at all.  The EPA and REAs have the authority to 
conduct environmental impact assessments,
44
 but this authority will be 
exercised only if a licensing authority (or a bank) refuses to go forward 
without EPA/REA approval.  The Ministry of Water Resources has legal 
authority to issue permits for the discharge of waste into water resources
45
 
but also does not issue any such permits in practice.  Instead, the Federal 
Investment Commission, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and regional 
government bureaus
46
 exercise permitting power over certain business 
 
 40. Ethiopian Water Resources Management Proc. No. 197/2000, FEDERAL NEGARIT 
GAZETA, art. 11(1)(d) [hereinafter WRM Proc.]; Ethiopian Water Resources Management 
Regulations, Council of Ministers Reg. No. 115/2005, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 11(1) 
[hereinafter WRM Reg.]. 
 41. Solid Waste Management Proc. No. 513/2007, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 4(2); 
Environmental Pollution Control Proc. No. 300/2002, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 4(1) 
[hereinafter EPC Proc.].  The Solid Waste Management Proclamation was issued in 2007, 
and it is not expected that urban administrations have taken steps yet to put their permitting 
systems in place.  The administrations also have the additional responsibility of conducting 
environmental audits on existing disposal sites and ensuring that new sites undertake 
environmental impact assessment. 
 42. Prevention of Industrial Pollution Regulation, Council of Ministers Reg. No. 
159/2008, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 5 [hereinafter PIP Reg.].  
 43. EPC Proc., supra note 41, art. 4. 
 44. Environmental Impact Assessment Proc. No. 299/2002, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, 
art. 3(1) [hereinafter EIA Proc.]. 
 45. WRM Reg., supra note 40, art. 11(1). 
 46. The regional governments, including Addis Ababa City Administration and the Dire 
Dawa Administrative Council, have separate divisions that handle business licenses and 
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activities and, through this permitting power, effectively decide whether or 
not to apply environmental criteria.  
The history of pollution standards in Ethiopia shows how reluctant the 
government has been to act in this area.  As early as 1995, the first 
proclamation establishing the EPA tasked the agency to set environmental 
standards.
47
  In 2002, the Environmental Protection Organs Establishment 
Proclamation (reestablishing the EPA) again gave EPA the power and duty 
to set environmental standards,
48
 and the Environmental Pollution Control 
Proclamation, also in 2002, more specifically called on the EPA to set 
standards for water, air, soil, noise, and waste management.
49
  Nonbinding 
ambient “guidelines” for air, surface water, groundwater, and noise have 
been in place at the EPA since at least 2004.  Nonetheless, the 
Environmental Council, the governing body of the EPA, did not pass 
binding standards until 2008, and even then restricted their purview to 
effluent air and water discharges.  
The Environmental Council of the EPA—which failed for six years to 
have any of its regular meetings—finally met and passed standards in 2008 
seemingly in response to a lawsuit waged by a nongovernmental 
organization (“NGO”), Action Professionals for the People (“APAP”). 
APAP sued the federal EPA in 2006, alleging in essence that the agency 
should have done something to prevent pollution to the Akaki and Mojo 
Rivers in the area near Addis Ababa.
50
  The EPA argued that APAP had 
standing to sue only the polluter, not the EPA, but at that time no standards 
existed on which APAP could base its suit.  Perhaps to forestall any greater 
judicial probing, EPA passed the standards in time for the Supreme Court’s 
assessment of the case in 2009.  Of course, the EPA did not state its exact 
motive for enacting the standards when it did.  
The same delays as those at the EPA have been apparent at the 
Ministry of Water Resources, which was first charged with establishing 
water quality standards in 1995.
51
  The 2000 Ethiopian Water Resources 
Management Proclamation again called for water quality standards, and 
prohibited discharges of pollution into water without a permit from the 
 
investment permits.  
 47. Environmental Protection Authority Establishment Proc. No. 9/1995, FEDERAL 
NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 6(3). 
 48. EPO Proc., supra note 35, art. 6(7). 
 49. EPC Proc., supra note 41, art. 6(1). 
 50. Action Professionals Association for the People v. Environmental Protection 
Authority, Civil File No. 64902, Federal First Instance Court (2006). 
 51. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs Proc. No. 4/1995, 
FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 17(9). 
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Ministry.
52
  The Proclamation explicitly anticipated a set of regulations that 
would lay out the details of the permitting process,
53
 but these regulations 
were not issued until 2005.  Unfortunately, although the regulations 
provide some detail on how a “Waste Water Discharge Permit” would be 
issued, they are premised on a set of water quality standards that do not 
exist and, furthermore, anticipate a directive that must be issued for the 
implementation of the waste water provision of the regulation.
54
  Neither 
the standards nor the directive has yet been issued.  Although the Ministry 
today engages in professional licensing and some construction permitting 
for water works projects, it does not issue permits for pollution 
discharges.
55
  The Ministry of Water Resources exhibits the same pattern of 
delay on environmental protection as the EPA, waiting for a proclamation, 
then for a regulation, and then for a directive, in order to control pollution.  
This process should be compared with the process to set up professional 
licensing at the Ministry of Water Resources, which was outlined in the 
same proclamation of 2000 as pollution permits but was implemented more 
quickly and efficiently.  
Presently, only two types of pollution standards have been adopted: 
effluent limits on certain water pollutants for a specified list of industries, 
and similar limits on certain air pollutants for a specified list of industries.  
There are no ambient standards for overall air and water quality, despite the 
fact that these are required by law, although it should be noted that ambient 
standards would present considerable costs in urban and regional planning, 
administrative coordination, and air and water testing.  
For the two pollution control standards that have been approved by the 
EPA, there remain serious problems with enforcement and implementation.  
The primary role for the EPA and REAs under the Environmental Pollution 
Control Proclamation is to monitor and inspect polluting industries.
56
  It has 
been argued, in fact, that the proclamation goes too far and provides too 
little oversight of Environmental Inspectors who, in enforcing the 
standards, may enter any place, question anyone, and inspect and seize any 
materials at the Inspector’s discretion.
57
  While such powers are sweeping 
 
 52. WRM Proc., supra note 40, art. 11(1)(d); WRM Reg., supra note 40, art. 11(1). 
 53. WRM Proc., supra note 40, arts. 11(1)(d), 11(2), 13(1), 14(2), 28(2), 30. 
 54. WRM Reg., supra note 40, art. 12(2); interview with official at Ministry of Water 
Resources (July 2009). 
 55. Interview with official at Ministry of Water Resources (July 2009). 
 56. See EPC Proc., supra note 41, art. 8(1)(a). 
 57. Id. art. 8(1). For a more detailed analysis of the problem of Inspector oversight, see 
Khushal Vibhute, Environmental Policy and Law of Ethiopia: A Policy Perspective, 23 J. 
ETHIOPIAN L. 75, 97 (2008). Vibhute worries that “[the EPC Proclamation] gives an 
impression that the [Environmental Inspector], in the name of seeking compliance with the 
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in law, they are not so sweeping in practice. Unlike a licensing power, a 
monitoring power is rather expensive and difficult to exercise.  The EPA or 
REA has to go to the industry in question with its own people, conduct its 
own inspections and tests, and confront powerful business interests head-on 
in the field.  The agencies simply do not have the resources or political 
standing to do this, and in practice they have not done it.
58
  As in most 
countries, the degree of environmental enforcement often depends more on 
political will than on the requirements of the law.
59
  
Along with the environmental standards, the Environmental Council 
simultaneously adopted the Prevention of Industrial Pollution (“PIP”) 
regulation that explained how the standards would be applied.  
Subsequently, in 2008, the EPA issued a directive identifying the eight 
categories of factories that fall under the regulation and thus are subject to 
the standards.
60
  The regulation gave existing factories (in one of the eight 
categories) a maximum of five years to comply with the standards, with the 
expectation that the EPA (or appropriate REA) would oversee the process 
of transition. Specifically, existing factories are called on to undertake an 
environmental audit and implement an environmental management plan.
61
  
Meanwhile, new factories will become operational without the direct 
oversight or approval of the EPA.  The Ministry of Trade and Industry or 
regional bureaus are expected to catch noncompliant factories at the time 
they apply for business licenses.  Theoretically, in order to obtain a 
business license, a factory must prove that it will meet the environmental 
standards and must continue to do so every year when it renews its 
license.
62
  This provides an opportunity to check environmental compliance 
 
[environmental standards], is free to exercise his powers even in a capricious manner with 
impunity.”  Id. at 98.  The only explicit restraint on Environmental Inspectors in the EPC 
Proclamation is that they “exercise due diligence and impartiality in the discharge of their 
powers and duties.”  EPC Proc., supra note 41, art. 7(2).  
 58. The EPA more or less admitted its failure to control pollution of the Akaki and 
Mojo Rivers in the APAP suit.  General problems with monitoring and inspections were 
confirmed by interview with EPA officials. 
 59. This is equally true of developed countries. For instance, amid allegations of loose 
environmental oversight at the U.S. EPA under the administration of former President 
George W. Bush, one survey found that two-thirds of the staff scientists at the EPA reported 
political interference with their work.  Meddling at EPA? Activists Point to Survey: Two-
Thirds of 1,586 EPA Scientists Polled Cite Interference, UCS Reports, ASSOC. PRESS, Apr. 
23, 2008. 
 60. EPA Directive NO. 008/2008, on file at the EPA.  Under the regulation, the EPA 
may choose to take action against a factory not identified by the directive if that factory 
poses a risk.  PIP Reg., supra note 42, art. 4(5). 
 61. PIP Reg., supra note 42, art. 12(2). 
 62. Currently, a business must renew its business license annually. See Commercial 
Registration and Business Licensing Proc. No. 67/1997, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 
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on a regular basis. 
The “competent licensing agency” for issuing a business license may 
be the Investment Commission, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, or a 
bureau of the regional government, depending on the type of project, where 
it is located, and whether foreign investors are involved.  In any case, none 
of these agencies has an environmental focus.  Officials at these licensing 
agencies are hardly aware of environmental standards and EPA directives; 
they have no expertise or incentive to evaluate license applications for 
compliance with environmental standards.  Accordingly, they do not 
actually apply environmental standards but rather defer to the EPA in 
expectation of future monitoring and enforcement. 
Notably, the PIP regulation requires an environmental check only in 
the case of “business licenses,” not investment permits.
63
  This changes the 
timing of things.  An investment permit is needed at the planning stages of 
a project; a business license is not required until the start of operations.  
Presumably, the factory may be designed and built to pollute in excess of 
the standards, and not be reviewed until it is ready to start production.  This 
is somewhat surprising, although it is expected that an environmental 
impact assessment would catch such an ill-designed factory at the planning 
stages.  If not, it is hard to imagine that a business license would be denied 
based on environmental problems—typically problems of design—at the 
point when the factory has been built and is ready to start production.  The 
review process in practice is more a matter of course, requiring a fee and 
validation of appropriate documents like the investment permit (if the 
applicant is a foreign national).  The Investment Commission, which has its 
own authority to issue an initial business license to an investor (although 
not a renewal), requires only the application, fee, and a signed statement by 





 63. See the definition of “competent licensing agency” in PIP Reg., supra note 42, art. 
2(1).  This is in contrast to the Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation, which 
requires that the licensing agency check EIA compliance before issuing “an investment 
permit or a trade or an operating license for any project.”  EIA Proc., supra note 44, art. 
3(3). 
 64. The Investment Commission’s authority to issue business licenses is based on the 
Investment Proclamation. See Investment (Amendment) Proc. No. 375/2003, FEDERAL 
NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 24(5). Notably, this provision indicates that the Investment 
Commission need not bother with article 22(2) of the Commercial Registration and Business 
Licensing Proclamation, which potentially requires, as part of an application for a business 
license, some type of confirmation of environmental compliance from the appropriate 
government organ.  In place of such confirmation, the Investment Commission requires the 
investor to sign “an undertaking to respect the relevant laws and directives of the land.”  Id. 
art. 13 (adding article 24(5) to the original Investment Proclamation).  Presumably, this was 
included in the Investment Proclamation in order to speed up the approval process for 
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Although the competent licensing agency has the main responsibility 
to deny a business license to an applicant who does not meet pollution 
control standards, the EPA has a separate power under the PIP regulations 
to vary or cancel existing business licenses of polluting industries.
65
  This is 
a strange provision that allows the EPA (or regional environmental 
authority) to intercede between the licensing authority and the license 
holder, and in effect makes the license holder beholden to two different 
government agencies for the same license.  It is hard to imagine the EPA 
exercising its authority to vary or cancel a license if to do so would offend 
the business licensing authority.  In addition, this provision confuses the 
direct line of accountability, because each of the two concerned agencies 
can blame the other for any failure to regulate polluting industries.  
Moreover, the regulation essentially places the onus of monitoring and 
gathering evidence about pollution on the EPA, which must have this 
evidence to prove that the license should be varied or cancelled.  At the 
time of application for the license, on the other hand, it is the applicant who 
provides the evidence that pollution will not exceed the requisite level.  
Officials at the EPA expect that environmental impact assessment 
(“EIA”) laws will ensure that new factories comply with environmental 
standards.  When it comes to the issue of new factories, most people, 
including officials at the licensing agencies, conflate EIA and pollution 
control. Although it might be more efficient to fold pollution control into 
the EIA process—at least for new factories—it must be kept in mind that at 
present EIA is a separate legal requirement that is itself difficult to enforce 
and is not set up formally to meet an explicit set of environmental 
standards.  Officials at the Investment Commission are not even aware of 
the pollution standards and are certainly not applying these standards in 
practice.  If the EIA process is to replace pollution control for new 
industries, this should be stated in the law and applied more rigorously by 






foreign investors and increase foreign direct investment.  Nonetheless, it is a rather 
surprising provision for its seemingly arbitrary and unequal treatment of investors.  A 
foreign applicant for a business license who goes through the Investment Commission may 
face fewer application requirements than a domestic applicant for the same license who goes 
through the Ministry of Trade and Industry or a regional bureau.  The provision also runs 
contrary to every other law that attempts to place responsibility on the licensing authority 
for environmental protection.  
 65. PIP Reg., supra note 42, arts. 6, 7. 
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IV. Environmental Impact Assessment and the  
Ethiopian Investment Commission 
 
Most pollution comes from new entrepreneurial undertakings, and the 
responsibility for encouraging and coordinating entrepreneurship in 
Ethiopia lies with the Ethiopian Investment Commission (“EIC”).  In 
Ethiopia from 1992 to 2009, about 71.1 percent of all capital investment 
was approved through the EIC.
66
  This indicates how important this one 
office is to the trajectory of economic development in Ethiopia.  The EIC 
deals with foreign investors or Ethiopians working in partnership with 
foreign investors, and issues investment licenses and other permits so that 
projects can proceed.  Permits for domestic investors will typically be 
obtained from regional bureaus, or may not even be required.
67
  In some 
cases, as for example with mining projects, the project proponent will need 
a specific permit from another government agency like the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy, and this permit will also be conditioned on the 
proponent satisfying EIA requirements. 
The EIC boasts of a one-stop shopping philosophy such that an 
investor can get government approval for a project through one office, the 
EIC.
68
  This means that EIC must undertake to coordinate with all other 
Ethiopian government agencies on behalf of the investor to get the project 
approved, for example by contacting the appropriate regional government 
to secure land for the project.  EIC itself takes over some of the 
responsibilities of other agencies, for example by issuing initial business 
permits and construction permits.  By law, EIC must respond to 
applications for investment licenses within five days,
69
 and publications by 
EIC tout its ability to deliver the investment permit within four hours.
70
  In 
the period between 1992 and 2009, the EIC gave out a total of 44,669 
investment licenses in various sectors, including agriculture, hunting, and 
forestry (9,715); construction (3,094); manufacturing (10,748); and mining 
 
 66. EIC database, accessed June 2009. 
 67. The EIC has jurisdiction over foreign investors and foreign and domestic partners, 
as well as domestic investors who want to be eligible for certain incentives.  Investment 
Proc. No. 280/2002, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 23.  Regional bureaus are responsible 
for investment by domestic investors in their regions, although an investment permit may or 
may not be required depending on regional laws.  Id. art. 23(3).  Regional bureaus also 
handle business licenses for projects in their regions.  Commercial Registration and 
Business Licensing Proc. No. 67/1997, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 20(1).  
 68. Investment Proc. No. 280/2002, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 24. 
 69. Investment (Amendment) Proc. No. 375/2003, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 
14(1). 
 70. INVESTMENT REVIEW, May 2009, on file at EIC. 




One of the government agencies with which EIC is supposed to 
coordinate is the EPA. The EIC is required by law to ensure that EIA either 
is done or is not mandated for the particular project before approving an 
investment permit.
72
  According to the language of the EIA Proclamation, a 
project proponent must have “authorization” from the federal EPA or REA 
to start a project that requires EIA, and it is incumbent upon the licensing 
agency to contact the EPA or REA for this authorization before issuing an 
investment permit or business license.  For EIC, the process of consulting 
EPA has been awkward and ultimately unsuccessful—not surprising 
considering that EIC wants to process investment applications efficiently 
and EIA takes a great deal of time.  The EIC has asserted alternatively that 
the EPA takes too long to verify that a project meets EIA requirements, or 
that the EPA always approves the project thereby making consultation a 
waste of time.
73
  Interestingly, it was proposed that EPA delegate its 
authority to review environmental impact statements to the EIC, but the 
EIC, perhaps wisely, refused. 
At present, EIC no longer consults the EPA for authorization and 
argues that the new Investment Proclamation, by omitting any reference to 
EIA, somehow overrides the requirement in the EIA Proclamation to get 
EPA authorization before issuing an investment permit.
74
  More troubling, 
the EIC has asserted repeatedly that it is the EPA’s responsibility to check 
for EIA compliance in the field after the investment permit has been 
approved.  It is hard to understand this argument.  The project may 
commence once the investment permit is issued, and the EIC itself may 
issue construction permits.  Once construction starts, it is too late to do 
EIA.  EIA only works if it is part of project planning.  Because the EIC is 
 
 71. EIC database, accessed July 2009. 
 72. EIA Proc., supra note 44, art. 3(3). 
 73. Interview with EIC officials (June 2009). 
 74. The original Investment Proclamation specifically required undertaking EIA before 
issuing an investment permit.  Investment Proc. No. 37/1996, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, 
art. 14(1).  The new Investment Proclamation (No. 280/2002) repealed the earlier 
proclamation and omitted any reference to EIA.  The Investment (Amendment) 
Proclamation (No. 373/2003) also did not add the EIA requirement.  Nonetheless, the new 
proclamations do not relieve the EIC’s duty as stated in the EIA Proclamation to check for 
EIA, because, although the proclamation latest in time prevails, provisions of previous 
proclamations should be repealed or superseded by something more than mere implication. 
The EIC’s argument, though spurious, seems to provide enough doubt to buffer the EIC 
from pressure to observe the EIA Proclamation.  Calls have been made to amend the 
Investment Proclamation so that it, too, includes a provision requiring the EIC to check with 
EPA before issuing a permit.  Unfortunately, no legal requirement can make the EIA 
process proceed quickly, so it is unlikely that EIA can be reconciled with the expedited 
service requirements that form the backbone of investment policy in Ethiopia.  
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involved so much in approving and coordinating investments, its failure to 
check for environmental compliance has the potential to lead to some 
egregious results.  For example, the EIC accidentally allowed a German 




Another notorious example of EIC’s lack of environmental concern 
comes from the floriculture industry.  Fertilizers and pesticides that are 
used to boost floriculture production are potentially harmful to human 
health and widely recognized as sources of pollution to soil, aquatic 
resources, and the atmosphere.
76
  Despite this fact, EIC has given permits 
to at least 251 investors in this sector without checking for environmental 
impacts.
77
  Additional investment licenses have been given out by regional 
investment bureaus (without checking for environmental impacts), 
including the Oromia Investment Bureau, which has given out 
approximately 3,491 hectares of land to the sector.
78
 
As with pollution standards, environmental impact assessment suffers 
from a lack of clear implementing guidelines.  The EIA Proclamation 
anticipated two directives to guide EIA: A directive explaining which 
projects are subject to EIA,
79
 and guidelines explaining how an 
Environmental Impact Study Report (“EISR”) should be prepared and 
evaluated.
80
  Although the EIA Proclamation was issued in 2002, it was not 
until 2008, at the first meeting of the Environmental Council of the EPA, 
that the Council approved a directive stating which industries are subject to 
EIA requirements.
81
  This is a major step forward, but it remains to be 
implemented through the Investment Commission and EPA.  Regrettably, 
there are still no legal standards for what the EISR must contain.  This is 
hard to understand, given that the EPA has had a comprehensive set of 
nonbinding draft guidelines for EISRs in almost every major industrial 





 75. See Demeke & Aklilu, supra note 30.  
 76. Mulugeta Getu, Ethiopian Floriculture and Its Impact on the Environment: 
Regulation, Supervision and Compliance, 3 MIZAN L. REV. 240, 243 (2009). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. EIA Proc., supra note 44, art. 5(1). 
 80. Id. art. 8(3). 
 81. Environmental Protection Authority [EPA], A Directive Issued to Determine 
Projects Subject to Environmental Impact Assessment, Dir. No. 1/2008, on file at the EPA. 
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V. Environmental Controls at the Regional Level 
 
Regional environmental authorities review EISRs from projects in 
their regions that do not have trans-regional effects and do not require 
federal permits or federal supervision.
82
  Unfortunately, the regional 
governments are even less prepared than the federal EPA to review EISRs 
with strict scrutiny, or to challenge government development projects or 
well-connected businessmen.  Some regional governments have adopted 
regional EIA regulations based on the federal law, although in general the 
regional governments lag behind the federal government in implementing 
environmental policies.  The Oromia regional government was reviewing 
its first draft EIA regulation in 2009.  In 2006, the Addis Ababa city 
government enacted an EIA regulation very similar to the federal EIA 
Proclamation but, like the federal proclamation, the city regulation awaits 




Unlike the EIA Proclamation, the Environmental Pollution Control 
Proclamation does not explain the exact separation of duties between the 
federal EPA and the regional environmental authorities.  Instead, it merely 
states that the regional government may adopt stricter environmental 
standards than the federal standards.
84
  Even a project with cross-regional 
impact or a federal license requirement would have to meet the local 
standards of the region in which it is located.  In such cases, the EPA and 
regional environmental authority probably would have overlapping 
responsibilities of inspection and enforcement, with the more stringent 
standards forming the baseline for both federal and regional agencies.
85
  
Decentralization is favored by the federal EPA, so it is unlikely that 
jurisdictional disputes would arise.  The greater problem here is that the 
regional governments do not have the resources or the political clout to 
stand up to larger industrial operations.  Also, without clearly defined roles 
for federal and regional authorities, the line of accountability to those 
authorities is confused. 
Some regional governments have adopted their own pollution control 
 
 82. EIA Proc., supra note 44, art. 14(1). 
 83. Addis Ababa City Government Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations No. 
21/2006. 
 84. EPC Proc., supra note 41, art. 6(4). 
 85. As an example of overlapping authority, the Addis Ababa pollution control 
regulation requests that applicants for pollution control permits bring their federal 
investment permit when they apply.  Such an applicant would end up with both a federal 
and a regional permit. 
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regulations, but the regional governments usually lag behind the federal 
government here as well.  For example, the Oromia regional government in 
2009 was still reviewing the first draft of its pollution control regulation, 
modeled substantially on the federal law.  The Addis Ababa city 
government first enacted pollution control regulations in 2007.  The Addis 
Ababa regulations, once implemented, will be a major advance over the 
federal law, setting up a separate environmental pollution control 
permitting system and providing detailed rules that explain application and 
review procedures for these permits.
86
  Unlike the federal EPA, which has 
direct control only over hazardous waste permits, the Addis Ababa EPA 
issues environmental permits itself and can force polluting industries to 
provide information about pollution at the time of permit application.  In 
addition, the regulations provide that, in case the applicable environmental 
standards are not yet in place, the Addis Ababa environmental agency will 
use “environmental standards issued by the concerned international 
organizations.”
87
  Despite such rigorous laws, it is expected that regional 
governments will have greater difficulty with implementation due to lack 
of funds, lack of expertise, small numbers of employees, and inability to 
challenge better-connected businessmen and the bigger agencies of the 
federal government. 
 
VI. Citizen Suits to Enforce Pollution Limits 
 
The alternative to government enforcement of standards is citizen 
enforcement of standards.  The Environmental Pollution Control (“EPC”) 
Proclamation authorizes citizens to appeal directly to the courts to enforce 
environmental standards against polluting industries without having to 
show a “vested interest.”
88
  Any citizen of Ethiopia, then, may bring a suit 
against a polluting industry.  The idea is that the citizen steps into the shoes 
of the EPA to enforce the standards.  Damages may include, in addition to 
the fines paid to the government and imprisonment, the full cost of 
restoring the environment “to the state in which the environment was prior 
to the infliction of the damage.”
89
  If this is not possible, then the industry 
pays compensation to the victims of the pollution.
90
  There is no explicit 
provision for compensating the citizen initiating the suit, who incurs the 
 
 86. See Addis Ababa City Government Environmental Pollution Control Regulations 
No. 25/2007. 
 87. Id. art. 5(2). 
 88. EPC Proc., supra note 41, art. 11. 
 89. Id. art. 17. 
 90. Id. 
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costs of litigation and pollution studies.  This is a shortcoming of the law 
because it might prevent poor people from coming forward.  Notably the 
APAP case, discussed below, was funded by APAP, an NGO with 
considerable resources and professional expertise.  In any case, citizen 
enforcement has the potential to be very effective but remains deeply 
problematic for other reasons. 
First, as the Supreme Court decided in the APAP case, citizens do not 
have standing to sue the EPA and can only proceed against the polluting 
industry directly.  Action Professionals for the People (“APAP”) sued the 
EPA in 2006, alleging that EPA’s own studies, as well as other independent 
studies, demonstrated conclusively that the Akaki and Mojo Rivers were 
being severely polluted by industrial waste from various factories as well as 
by untreated waste from the city of Addis Ababa.
91
  The EPA’s response, in 
essence, was that because pollution standards had not yet been adopted, it 
was impossible to say that pollution had occurred.  This argument was 
awkward for EPA, considering that it was the EPA’s failure to enact 
standards in the first place that had prevented APAP from suing the 
offending industries directly.  The legal point on which EPA eventually 
succeeded was that APAP did not have standing to sue the EPA.  This point 
was not entirely clear from the EPC Proclamation, which says merely that, 
if a person files a complaint with EPA about a polluter and is not satisfied 
with EPA’s response, that person can then “institute a court case.”
92
  
Against whom?  The Supreme Court decided that a citizen suit can only 
proceed against the polluter.  In fact, this is probably the right decision 
from the standpoint of the legislature’s intent.  The citizen suit provision in 
the EPC Proclamation waives the “vested interest” requirement initially for 
the purpose of facilitating citizen complaints to the EPA against polluters. 
Considering the current political environment and the shortage of 
government funds, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to open the 
door to litigation against EPA.  In the end, APAP achieved a victory of 
sorts when the EPA finally enacted pollution standards.  As will be seen, 
however, this does not mean that industries along the Akaki and Mojo 
Rivers will be forced to immediately comply with the standards. 
 
 91. Action Professionals Association for the People v. Environmental Protection 
Authority, Civil File No. 64902, Federal First Instance Court (2006).  For a brief summary 
of the case, see Vibhute, supra note 57, at 95.  Wondwossen Sintayehu of the EPA also 
produced a summary of the case at the pleading stage. WONDWOSSEN SINTAYEHU, ENVTL. 
PROT. AUTH., ACTION PROFESSIONALS’ ASSOCIATION FOR THE PEOPLE VS. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AUTHORITY: REPORT ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION CASE INSTITUTED AT 
THE FEDERAL FIRST INSTANCE COURT OF ETHIOPIA, available at www2.unitar.org/cwm/ 
publications/cw/tw/tw10/written/gov/Ethiopia_Wondwossen_Sintayehu.pdf.  
 92. EPC Proc., supra note 41, art. 11(2). 
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If citizens cannot use the courts to compel EPA to take action, EPA 
will have complete discretion over whether to set pollution standards and 
whether to monitor the emissions of industries.  When EPA delays and 
does not pass standards, or does not take enforcement actions on a case-by-
case basis for particularly bad offences, or fails to conduct adequate 
inspections, then citizens have no recourse but to complain to the EPA and, 
if dissatisfied, appeal only up to the level of the head of the EPA, from 
which there apparently is no further appeal.
93
  The solution to this problem 
is political: Citizens can still mobilize pressure on the national government, 
or, perhaps more appropriately in this case, on regional governments.  
Underlying these issues is a more pertinent issue: The EPA and the REAs 
are underfunded, and their activities can be curtailed through subtle 
pressures exerted by wealthy industries and investors.  
With regard to the standards that have been passed, which presumably 
should afford citizens an opportunity to sue industries directly, there are yet 
many problems.  To be effective at enforcement, citizens need to be 
informed about the standards.  Under Ethiopian administrative law, 
“standards” are a species of “directive” and are not required to be published 
in the federal Negarit Gazeta, so they are not readily available to the 
public.  Unless citizens go to the EPA and request specific information, 
they will not have the appropriate environmental standards in hand.  This is 
not a problem for sophisticated actors like APAP operating out of Addis 
Ababa, but it is a problem for the average citizen. 
Additional concerns have been raised that citizens need information 
about the activities of a particular factory in order to support a claim that a 
standard has been violated.
94
  The standards are not ambient standards, 
which set acceptable amounts of pollution in air and water bodies, but 
rather are effluent standards that set limits on the amount of certain 
pollutants generated by a particular factory.  Thus, it is not enough to show 
that a particular water body is polluted or that air in a particular area is 
polluted.  Rather, citizens involved in a suit would have to test the effluent 
discharges of a particular factory.  Typically, the amount of discharge is 
information to which only the factory and Environmental Inspectors have 
access.  To solve this problem, the government could give citizens a right 
to EPA’s records or a right to get information directly from the polluting 
industry.  To some degree, citizens already may access those records at the 
EPA that have been made public.  This access is limited in practice, 
however, and in any case citizens cannot force the EPA to gather the 
 
 93. PIP Reg., supra note 42, art. 10(3). 
 94. See Vibhute, supra note 57, at 96.  
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necessary information and make it public, nor can they sue the EPA for 
failure to enforce the standards against a particular industry.  A better 
solution is to give citizens direct access to information about the factory, 
either through court orders stemming from citizen suit litigation or through 
a public reporting process. 
Interestingly, the Environmental Council deleted a provision of the 
Prevention of Industrial Pollution (“PIP”) Regulation that would have 
allowed “anybody” to get information about pollution directly from the 
concerned factory.  It was decided that this information is the factory’s 
property, and that information including the environmental management 
plan, the report for the implementation of the PIP Regulation, and the 
information gathered through periodic supervisions and checkups would be 
available to the public at the EPA.  The worry was that, if the public had a 
right to information, “expenses will be incurred by the information provider 
[and] unexpected outcomes might occur.”
95
  This avoids the more 
important issue, which is why are not all reports submitted by the factory 
made as public as possible?  The EPA could require factories to publish 
information about their pollution levels in a newspaper (or simply include 
all of this information on the permit itself and post the permit in a public 
place).  The expenses of publishing this information are minimal.  Under 
the PIP Regulation, every factory must submit an annual report relating to 
how it is meeting the pollution standards, but this report goes directly to the 
EPA rather than to the general public.
96
  
Citizen enforcement against industry is the ultimate type of 
government decentralization, at least of executive powers.  Every citizen is 
a policeman.  In the end, it would be numerous local and federal courts that 
would decide the matter of liability.  This is an inviting scenario, and cost-
effective for the government.  Clearly, however, many administrative 
reforms are needed before citizen suits will work properly.  Citizens need 
to have a public forum where pollution standards and EPA reports on 
polluting industries are accessible.  One solution already mentioned is to 
change the directive so that EPA and REAs issue environmental permits.  
The permit itself could state the applicable pollution standards, and regular 
permit renewals would give EPA the opportunity to gather information 
from the industry without incurring all of the expenses of an on-site 
inspection.  The industry would be required to report its pollution as part of 
the permit application. In addition, if EPA received many citizen 
complaints about one industry, the agency would be in a position to drag 
 
 95. Environmental Council First Ordinary Meeting Minutes (April 23, 2008). 
 96. PIP Reg., supra note 42, art. 11(2). 
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out the permitting process and collect more information.  Once public, the 
information would provide the basis for a citizen suit. 
 
VII. What Ethiopia’s Permitting Process Says About  
Ethiopian Views of Sustainability 
 
Perhaps the main question raised by Ethiopia’s permitting process is, 
why is the Ethiopian government so eager to pass strong environmental 
policies and initiating laws and yet so reluctant to pass implementing laws 
and pollution standards?  A variety of different actors in the Ethiopian 
government are ready to cooperate with foreign donors who want to 
contribute money toward stronger environmental policies.  This includes 
government officials from members of the previous communist regime to 
the current workers at the EPA and Ministry of Water Resources.  
However, these same actors uniformly resist making strong decisions to 
implement environmental policies to stop environmental harms.  This is not 
only true of the EPA and the Ministry of Water Resources, but also of the 
regional governments that have considerable discretion in implementing 
federal environmental policy at the regional level.  Because this delaying 
pattern is so consistent, it is not likely that the problem is with a few lazy or 
corrupt government workers or a few powerful individuals with feelings of 
insidious anti-environmentalism.  
It is instructive to compare environmental permitting with the 
permitting system being set up to regulate nongovernmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) under the Charities and Societies Proclamation.
97
  The Charities 
and Societies Proclamation was issued in 2009, and already the Charities 
and Societies Agency has been formed. Licensing of NGOs (“re-
registration”) has also commenced—by the end of 2009, 1,200 local and 
foreign NGOs had been licensed. In 2009, the same year the proclamation 
was issued, a draft directive was already under consideration.  This shows 
what the government can accomplish in a short time if the political will is 
present. 
Arguments about the difficulties of enforcing environmental laws are 
not entirely convincing.  First, enforcement is not held up by lack of 
training or expertise.  Environmental standards can be copied from other 
countries, and have been copied.  Since 2004, the EPA has had its own set 
of nonbinding environmental quality standards and nonbinding EIA 
guidelines ready for adoption into law.  These have not been adopted.  
Several studies have been done of pollution in the area around Addis 
 
 97. Charities and Societies Proc. No. 621/2009, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA. 
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Ababa, particularly of pollution in the Akaki and Mojo Rivers, and it is 
apparent that the scientific expertise for these kinds of studies is available.  
A more compelling explanation is the lack of government funds to 
support the personnel and infrastructure for environmental regulation over 
the long term.  Adopting strong environmental policies is cheap and easy, 
especially if a foreign donor is contributing money for studies and policy 
development.  On the other hand, maintaining a complex regulatory 
infrastructure staffed by experts is difficult and expensive.  
Lack of funds is only a partial explanation, however, because it cannot 
account for the federal government’s apparent reluctance to allow citizens 
to enforce environmental standards on their own through the courts.
98
  
Citizen enforcement is considerably less expensive than enforcement by 
regulatory agencies.  If the regulatory agency does nothing but enact the 
standards, the citizens can at least bring suits against the worst offenders.  
Although lawsuits present some cost to the courts, the government could 
recoup these costs with fines and penalties, and, after the first few cases, 
the mere threat of litigation should be enough to keep offending industries 
in line without having to litigate every infraction.  
Lack of funds also does not entirely explain the government’s 
reluctance to implement EIA laws, as the expense of an environmental 
impact study report is borne by the project proponents.
99
  Once project 
proponents learn that they must prepare a report, they hire an 
environmental consultant to do the technical work.  It would be relatively 
easy to require that such consultants be licensed by the government,
100
and 
revocation of the license and criminal fines could be imposed on 
consultants for watering down reports or accepting bribes from 
proponents.
101
  The remaining expense to the government is for experts at 
the EPA who must review the reports.  Although this expense cannot be 
avoided, it is considerably less than the expense of preparing the report, 
and requires only cross-checking rather than detailed investigative work. 
The obvious explanation for the government’s inaction on pollution is 
that the government is fearful of stifling economic development.  This is a 
 
 98. Citizen suits may seem like a modern legislative innovation, but in fact very similar 
lawsuits were used under the common law of England and the U.S. before industrialization 
to control isolated cases of pollution.  Citizens could sue for nuisance when pollution 
crossed onto their property and disturbed their use and enjoyment of their land.  
 99. EIA Proc., supra note 44, art. 7(3). 
 100. In fact, the EIA Proclamation hints that the EPA will issue standards for EIA 
consultants.  See id. art. 7(2). 
 101. It is already a criminal offense to make misrepresentations in an environmental 
impact study report.  Id. art. 18(2). 
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fear both of losing central control of economic planning and of scaring off 
investment by increasing the cost of business.  These are fears shared by 
many citizens. In the first place, decentralized management of economic 
issues (citizen enforcement of pollution standards is a type of decentralized 
economic management) is a threat to the structure of any modernizing 
economy.  Karl Polanyi has argued convincingly that economic 
development appears to be organic and from the ground up, but in fact is 
dependent on centralized coordination and the repression of various local 
and individual interests.
102
  It is dangerous from the perspective of 
government to create enforceable environmental rights, for example the 
right to be free from a specific amount of pollution, because rights are by 
their nature decentralized.  The right could be asserted by one person 
against everyone else, even though everyone else has agreed to waive that 
environmental right in exchange for the economic benefits of polluting.  
The threat is not of a grassroots environmental movement, but rather of a 
small group of Ethiopian environmentalists holding hostage popular 
development plans by strictly imposing environmental standards. 
The fear of scaring off investment comes from the perceived threat 
that other competing political jurisdictions will attract businesses more than 
Ethiopia.  Competition among jurisdictions produces the well-known 
regulatory race to the bottom, in which jurisdictions reduce legal regulation 
of business more and more in order to become the most attractive suitor to 
business ventures.  The race to the bottom is the inevitable effect of 
allowing expansive markets at a level higher than the scale of government.   
If a company can enter Ethiopia, employ Ethiopians, and generate revenues 
to be spent in Ethiopia, this gives the company a kind of power to negotiate 
terms with Ethiopia.  Some companies can and do demand less 
environmental regulation.
103
  Similarly, much like an international 
company vis-à-vis the national government, a national company may 
demand terms from local governments in exchange for jobs and growth 
brought to the locality.
104
  The victims of pollution may agree to pollution 
as part of an unbalanced exchange, in which they receive some kind of 
employment or minor financial compensation.  Alternatively, depending on 
the integrity of the local government, a national company may be allowed 
to pollute because the victims of this pollution are a small and politically 
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inconsequential group.  
Discussions about sustainability in Ethiopia may be a superficial 
proxy for deeper concerns about resource distribution.  That is, while it 
appears that people are talking about how to prevent pollution, they are in 
fact thinking about how the people who receive the benefits from economic 
development do not share these benefits with the people who suffer the 
environmental harms of economic development.  If resource distribution is 
the popular concern in Ethiopia, then the government is right to focus on 
international aid concessions and redistribution of wealth within the 
country rather than on environmental laws that aspire to overall 
environmental health as measured by science.  The permitting process 
could be changed to fit the Ethiopian context, for example by focusing on 
discreet payments from polluting industries—a kind of anticipatory tax on 
pollution.  When businesses apply for permits, the government could assess 
likely pollution and increase the permit fee based on likely environmental 
harm and economic damage to local residents.  
 
VIII. Conclusions and Further Considerations 
 
Environmental laws in Ethiopia are meant to protect the productive 
capacity of the land.  They include guarantees of an individual’s right to 
access land, and they make promises to control the threats to natural 
resources from modern factories and from development. This is not just 
subterfuge.  The Ethiopian government wants to protect the country’s 
resources, but in a context in which economic development is an absolute 
imperative.  The only available model for economic development, whether 
it comes from the U.S. or China, is to continue nationalization and 
internationalization of markets and preempt any calls for total redistribution 
of wealth with promises of general social protections like pollution 
prevention.  It is perhaps assumed that, after development is well 
underway, the government will then have the time and resources to go back 
and make good on its promises of environmental health.  To some extent 
this may be a real possibility, but at the same time it is prudent to confront 
the real environmental costs of development, the real distribution of these 
costs, and the real contradiction between meaningful local control and the 
imperatives of a nationalizing and internationalizing economy.  
Real environmental protection may require a different kind of 
economy, and certainly will require environmental controls at the same 
scale as markets.  Often it is assumed that the scale problem can be solved 
only by expanding environmental regulation to the international level, but 
an equally plausible solution is to reduce the scope and impact of markets 
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to national or local levels, or in other words to re-socialize markets.  Along 
similar lines, real environmental protection requires decision-makers who 
recognize the environment (or distribution of environmental harms) as a 
problem.  At present, important decision-makers in government are 
connected directly to industry or focused myopically on business and 
development.  It is vague economic indicators, often short term, that weigh 
heavily on the minds of decision-makers everywhere, and not so much the 
indicators of environmental health.  To change this, government decision-
makers must be isolated from industrial elites in a purposeful manner.  
How will local discussions about sustainability within Ethiopia help 
improve Ethiopia’s natural environment?  How will meaningful local 
discussions be achieved?  Local discussions should not be held in the strait 
jacket of objective scientific discourse on “sustainability,” but instead 
should focus attention on the real concerns of Ethiopian citizens, like 
resource distribution, that are the only hope for motivated political action 
on environmental issues.  Scientific problem-solving is crucial to dealing 
with the world’s environmental problems, but it does not substitute for 
political motivation.  Neither is environmental science value-neutral.  If 
science is controlled by urban elites, it may be used simply to further elite 
interests.  
Many of the current environmental laws ought to be reformed, not 
because they are objectively bad laws, but because they pacify the citizenry 
with language invoking the power of science and the international 
community and offer vast promises that cannot be fulfilled.  These reforms, 
though they may be initiated by elites in Addis Ababa, can at least serve to 
expose administrative decisions to greater (and wider) public scrutiny 
going forward.  Some general suggestions from this article include (1) 
empowering the EPA and REAs to issue environmental permits; (2) 
providing a secure source of funding and stronger political standing for the 
EPA (for example, earmarked funds from foreign donors who want to 
contribute to global sustainability); (3) setting up definite links between the 
EPA and REAs so that EPA can assist REAs with expert advice and 
injection of funds when needed, and so that their respective responsibilities 
are clear; (4) making EPA and REAs the center for all environmental 
decision making, thus cleaning up the line of accountability so that citizens 
know which agency is responsible for which decision; (5) making EPA and 
REAs a place for public discussion and dissemination of information about 
pollution and other environmental risks; and (6) placing a positive duty on 
the EPA to provide information about polluters to citizens interested in 
citizen suits. 
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